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There is nothing like a public accusation directed at a doctoral program to mobilise 
university managers and academics. ‘Super PhD Loses out to Blondes and 
Vampires’1. ‘Dumbing Down Charge Denied’2. ‘Academic Stripped of Doctoral 
Title’3 - headlines such as these, whether they appear in the tabloid press or in more 
‘respectable’ media sources, trumpet to all and sundry that something’s rotten in that 
highest of higher education credentials, the doctorate. In so doing, they strike at the 
heart of any university’s claim to quality research and teaching. Little wonder then 
that such headlines so often evoke a spate of defensive denials (including predictable 
counter-accusations about the erosion of academic freedom) and/or a rush of re-
assurances on the part of the university in question, followed closely by a flurry of 
quality assurance paperwork within the said university, and a frisson of nervousness 
in other universities on guard against guilt by association.   
 
In this paper, we are seeking to provide an account of doctoral education that is 
unusual in that it is focused on the seamy side of doctorates – on scandal and its 
minimisation. Our interest is in what counts as scandal, and what is done either to 
ensure against the danger of scandal or to control reputational damage to a doctorate 
once it has occurred. Before moving to a thematic reading of the doctorate-as-scandal, 
we provide a conceptualisation of risk as an organisational logic for producing the 
practices of reputational management, and we briefly recover the ‘forgotten history’ 
of doctoral education in Australia, focusing on the doctorate a controversial 
newcomer to the academy. This historicising move, when taken together with 
contemporary theorising of rationalities of risk, allows for a thematic reading of 
current risks for doctoral education that is knowing rather than naïve, situated rather 
than self-evident.      
 
Risk and higher education  
Scandal is one effect of the failure to manage risk. As Anthony Giddens (2002) 
reminds us, the idea of risk – of “hazards that are actively assessed in relation to 
future possibilities” (p.22) – is a modernist notion necessary to a society that “lives 
after the end of nature” (p.27), that is, after magic, cosmology and the fates have 
given way to scientific calculation and/as insurance. Giddens understands the 
modernist notion of risk as giving rise to “a new moral climate” in which social 
organisations are increasingly focused on danger – the danger of failing to perform in 
ways that are morally and politically, as well as organizationally, acceptable.  
 
This risk consciousness does important work as a focus of organizational knowledge 
and thus for staff development and performance. As Beck (1992) argues, risk society 
is characterized by negative logic, a shift away from the management and distribution 
of material/industrial ‘goods’ to the management and distribution of ‘bads’, i.e., the 
control of knowledge about danger, about what might go wrong and about the systems 
needed to guard against such a possibility.  
 
Concerns about the capacities of Australian universities to self-manage around risk – 
its identification and its minimization - have been a theme of successive governments 
in recent times. They are made explicit in government bureaucrat Michael Gallagher’s 
(2000) summation of outcomes of discussions between the Australian Federal 
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Government’s Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DETYA, now 
DEST) and senior university executives. He states that these discussions pointed to “a 
number of failures” (p.38) that he links to the “trial and error dimension” of university 
management practice to date. According to Gallagher, it is the lack of uniformity of 
practice within universities that is the key culprit in producing failure. “The next 
phase of development”, Gallagher concludes “…can be expected to be more 
formalized and professionally risk managed” (p.38). This sentiment is echoed in the 
Higher Education Management Review Committee in Australia (Hoare, Stanley, 
Kirkby and Coaldrake, 1995) and in the Dearing Report (1997) in the United 
Kingdom. Both Committees foreground the failure of universities to develop the sort 
of management culture necessary to self-regulation in relation to organizational 
performance. 
 
Risk management-as-risk-minimisation has now achieved the status of a high priority, 
institution-wide system of communication in all Western organisations, including 
universities. It is a system into which the local, disciplinary-specific or ‘craft’ 
knowledge of academics, administrators and auxiliary others must be plugged in order 
to count as the proper knowledge of the truly professional worker. It is not that local 
knowledge is being displaced altogether. Rather it is being made over as ‘professional 
expertise’ through a process that Ericson and Haggerty (1997) describe thus:    
 
[P]rofessionals obviously have ‘know-how’, [but] their ‘know-how’ does not 
become expertise until it is plugged into an institutional communication 
system. It is through such systems that expert knowledge becomes 
standardized and robust enough to use in routine diagnosis, classification, and 
treatment decisions by professionals.  (p.104)  
 
As ‘professional experts’, academics know, among other things, how to manage their 
teaching and research so that scandal is highly improbable. In the unlikely event of an 
accusation becoming public, the clear audit trail that is the hallmark of the true 
professional can be put to work to shore up institutional and individual reputation 
against the slings and arrows of outrageous and damning publicity.      
 
The idea that academe is being made the subject of “routine diagnosis, classification, 
and treatment decisions” may well be viewed as an Orwellian development in 
education. However, we are not seeking in this paper to make any moral or 
ideological judgment of this type. Thus we are not seeking to point the finger at 
‘managerialism’ or any other sort of ‘ism’. Nor are we seeking to advocate  ‘more 
effective’ risk management. We are seeking rather to understand what doctoral 
practices come to count as so risky as to be scandalous, and with what effects on the 
nature of the work that academics and academic managers do in a doctoral program.   
 
Risk-as-waste  
Strategies for managing risk in higher degree programs around the world are not 
uniform. ‘Post-welfare’ higher education systems such as the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand tend to exhibit more overt regulatory pressure from government than those in 
Europe or the USA. This reflects a shift in the positioning of government with respect 
to higher education, as certain governments move from being patrons of universities 
to being buyers of higher education services and products (McWilliam and O’Brien, 
1999). For ‘post-welfare’ governments (e.g., Australia, New Zealand and the UK), the 
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twin imperatives of maximising the productivity of higher degrees and improving the 
risk management practices of universities are a crucial part of the new agenda. 
According to the Knowledge and Innovation policy statement (Kemp, 1999), the 
training of HDR students constitutes a major resource in terms of research 
productivity, academic renewal and dissemination of “knowledge and skills within 
and between the research and wider communities” (p. 17). Part of this new risk 
management agenda involves “reduc[ing] the high rates of drop-out and significant 
waste of both talent and investment” (DETYA, 2000: 10), through new models of 
government funding that “recognize and reward those institutions that provide high-
quality research training environments and support excellent and diverse research 
activities” (DETYA, 2001a: 4). The effect is to render higher degree programs 
operating within publicly funded universities more financially accountable to 
government as the representative of the tax-paying public.  
 
The rise of a public demand for waste identification and eradication is argued by 
Lawson (1999) to be one marker of greater public interest in the funding of higher 
education in general and research training in particular. Lawson elaborates thus:  
 
Because higher education is valued, it is potentially a commodity. But it is 
only a commodity worth paying for if it can be made to seem scarce. Once it is 
scarce it can be competed for, accounted for, and subject ed to audits that will 
inevitably disclose how those scarce resources are being wasted…higher 
degree education…has been redefined as a ‘scarce’ commodity which we can 
ill-afford to ‘waste’.  (p.11) 
Lawson goes on to demonstrate the ways in which conflations of postgraduate student 
data relating to attrition and completion rates render the field vulnerable to 
accusations of waste.  Most importantly, he notes how such accusations, once made, 
continue to be fed by dubious claims about the irrelevance of much higher degree 
study and employer dissatisfaction with higher degree graduates (p.11).        
 
Public suspicion around the possibility that doctoral standards might be in decline 
work through a similar ‘waste-identification’ logic. Such allegations are made both 
within and outside the sector, and may target ‘alternative’ doctoral programs (eg, 
professional doctorates, honorary doctorates) and alternative pathways within the PhD 
(eg, PhD by Publication) by raising questions around the extent to which they are 
deserving of the award ‘doctorate’.   
 
Concerns about the exact nature and purpose of honorary doctorates are long-terms 
within and outside the academy and would thus demand fuller analysis than can be 
accomplished within the confines of this paper, although we do allude to some public 
unease in relation to ‘silliness’ and honorary doctorates later in the discussion. 
Alternative pathways within PhD programs are certainly a source of consternation in 
terms of their management within the higher education sector, but the matter of 
whether or not a particular journal is of high enough standing, or a number of 
publications is sufficient, or whether publications are of sufficient length, or whether 
and how co-authored articles should be accommodated – all  high stakes issues that 
pre-occupy academics and higher degree managers - are unlikely to be of interest 
outside the sector. Journalists looking for ‘scandalous’ copy have shown themselves 
to be much less interested in such matters than they are in odd PhD topics and  forms 
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of academic dishonesty and/or malpractice such as plagiarism or ‘bogus’ 
qualifications.            
 
However, professional doctorates, as relative newcomers to the doctoral program 
ensemble, have had a more recent and troubled passage to legitimacy, and have thus 
been a prime focus for gleaning evidence of  ‘declining standards’.  In ‘DBAs dogged 
by uneven standards’ (The Australian Higher Education Supplement, 4 March, 2002), 
Jim Buckell foregrounds a Monash University report that raises just this sort of 
suspicion in relation to ‘variations’ across the 20 Doctor of Business Administration 
degree programs operating in Australian universities:  
 
Until a benchmark of admission criteria, teaching and research standards, and 
expected outcomes at the DBA level is established, then poorer quality DBA 
degrees will continue to compromise the integrity and acceptability of the DBA 
as a suitable alternative to the PhD. (p25)  
 
The article goes on to note the number of equivalent full-time students enrolled in 
such degrees and the average cost for a degree ($35,000).  What is implied here is 
that, as a financial investment, such programs may give poor returns. Our point is not 
to become part of a debate about whether or not such claims are justified, but to 
foreground the work they do as a discourse about doctoral education, framing it as a 
suspect terrain ripe for risk management.   
 
In the context of substantial cuts to public funding support for universities, such 
claims have been made as part of a strong call from governments, and within the 
sector itself, for universities to “be highly business aware” (Considine et al., 2001: 
32), and to focus more squarely on the needs and priorities of industry, rather than 
pander to ‘in-club’ academic fads and fashions. While the imperative here is not a 
simple matter of the university operating as a business, nevertheless universities are to 
provide the public (and private) goods (education and training of knowledge workers) 
that underpin the production of private goods by other agents (Considine et al., 2001).  
In terms of higher degree training, this means ensuring that no student must fail to 
acquire the skills and knowledge to undertake research in diverse settings (including 
industry) and in the context of the new global knowledge economy (DETYA, 2001b).  
Thus, identification of “deficiencies in the current structure and performance of higher 
education research and research training” has focused squarely on unacceptable waste 
of resources associated with long completion times and low completion rates (Kemp, 
1999: 2). Waste is danger, and accusations of waste, whether as ‘silly’ topics, ‘soft’ 
programs or credential skulduggery, is always potentially scandalous.    
 
Risk events 
The cultural theorizing of risk is a conceptual field which allows us to investigate the 
conditions of possibility for doctoral practices to become vulnerable to accusations 
of waste, and thereby to become scandalous. Put another way, risk theory can help 
us understand how a particular research topic, teaching practice or program can be 
thinkable as a serious danger, and with what effect on universities.  
 
The conceptual model of “the social amplification of risk” provided by Kasperson et 
al (1998) is helpful here. Working out of the assumption that the investigation of risk 
is both “a scientific activity and an expression of culture” (p.149), these scholars fill a 
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gap in risk research by explaining how an apparently minor risk (e.g., an unusual 
thesis topic) might produce massive public reactions. They use the term “risk events” 
to describe “occurrences that are manifestations of the risk and that initiate signals 
pertaining to the risk” (p.150). A risk event is usually “specific to a particular time 
and location”, but comes to “interact with psychological, social and cultural 
processes” in ways that “heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and related 
risk behaviour” (p.150). An allegation gains the status of a “risk event” if and when it 
interacts with other socio-cultural processes to produce behaviours that serve to 
increase the perceived danger, triggering demands for “additional organizational 
response and protective actions or impeding needed protective actions” (p.151). This 
explains, at least in part, the doubleness of the play of risk, as it loops back up on 
itself, thereby proliferating the actions and reactions that constitute its management.  
 
As a risk event, a particular allegation is initially neither a ‘true’ (absolute) nor a 
‘distorted’ (socially determined) risk within the academy. Risk events signal practices 
that are then discovered to exist in universities and become the object of damning 
publicity. For example, the practice of providing extra support to international 
students with English as a second language may well be ‘re-invented’ as a ‘soft’ 
doctoral program, just as the requirement that an examiner take account of cross-
cultural issues when examining the products of a doctoral program may well be re-
invented as ‘soft marking’. This is not to say that ‘soft marking’ is entirely fictive – 
merely to argue that it is a term which arises at this point in history to make a 
particular kind of sense (about assessment processes) and so to do a particular kind of 
work in governing academic practices. As a knowledge object, ‘soft marking’ works 
through a negative logic that mobilizes more efficient surveillance practices in 
universities which understandably fear negative attention from potential markets, 
governments, other funding bodies and the general community. When something 
happens that is alleged to be an instance of ‘soft marking’, a whole organizational 
culture is mobilized by the naming of this occurrence – it is now a risk event and thus 
in need of risk management.  
 
 
Risky history 
Risk events mobilised by doctoral education practices are not new. It takes only a 
limited foray into the doctorate’s shady past to begin to see that the doctorate, far 
from being the gold standard of university programs, has been a very risky enterprise 
indeed for universities. Certainly at the turn of the twentieth century, it was deemed 
within the academy that original investigation, the art and science of true research, 
would never be forthcoming from “mere training” of the sort that was represented by 
the PhD (Rae, 2002). Training could only mean “damage to originality that slavish 
pursuit of [a]degree has caused”  (Hoyle, cited in Rae, 2002: 131), and so the PhD 
remained suspect for decades in terms of its legitimacy as an induction into the 
mysterious and tightly bounded world called ‘research’. ‘Training-in-originality’ was 
clearly oxymoronic, and was declared to be so by many distinguished persons within 
the academy. As a teaching qualification in earlier times, the doctorate also suffered 
from the fact that “bribery was by no means unknown” (Haskins, 1963: 230) in its 
conferral. 
 
Having shrugged off some of the more dubious aspects of its past (or alternatively 
handed them on to the emerging ‘professional doctorate’), the PhD now occupies a 
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much more noble symbolic position, and this means that it is highly vulnerable if and 
when an allegation of waste, low standards or otherwise shonky practice, can be made 
to stick. In our reading of recent media allegations that relate to doctoral practice in 
Australia and elsewhere, we have been able to identify three broad thematics which 
are characteristic of a discourse of waste  – namely, allegations of ‘silliness’ in 
relation to thesis content, allegations of ‘softness’ in relation to entry, rigour and 
assessment, and allegations of suspect conduct and/or credentials.  
 
Silly doctorates 
One key marker of doctoral education-in-trouble is the identification of a particular 
thesis topic or dissertation as inappropriately trivial. A trawl of recent media 
allegations related to thesis topics reveals the unsurprising finding that most 
accusations of inappropriateness target the humanities in general and cultural studies 
in particular. Such allegations are likely to pit apparently serious, weighty and 
industry-relevant topics against apparently vapid and ephemeral ones. For example, 
“Super PhD Loses out to Blondes and Vampires” (Sun Herald, 13 July 2003, p.15) 
frames a “boring though worthy” PhD about superannuation being written by a 
“talented commerce graduate” as losing out to “a PhD about the supposed 
homosexuality of Jesus”, “the desirability … of blondes”, “Tattoos”, “the divorce of 
Nicole Kidman and Tom Cruise”, the “neo-spiritualism of Wonder Woman and Xena, 
Warrior Princess”, the “surf culture of Bali” and “vampires” (ibid). What is assumed 
in all of these media reports is that the content and quality of the thesis in its entirety 
can be understood and endorsed or dismissed on the basis of the title or an idea that is 
important within the larger dissertation.    
 
In the Sun Herald article, the list of unworthy topics above precedes the assertion that 
there are currently “1550 Australian Postgraduate Awards at a cost of $87 million”, 
with “more than 36,000 students studying for their PhDs” and so “competition is stiff” 
(ibid). The proposition in this article, then, is that one PhD student’s thesis in a 
particular university, whether ‘silly’ or not, is in direct competition for places with 
those in a different faculty in a different university, and that universities are more 
likely to fund “fun” than substance. And that this is so despite the call for more 
industry relevance, all of which begs the question, “Are we getting value for money 
from our nation’s most educated brains?” (ibid).  The article concludes with a 
suggestion that a new formula for funding PhDs be applied to ensure that “the more 
‘fun’ a topic, the less chance of funding” (ibid). 
 
In essence, the allegation made in the media article is of waste through a failure of 
quality control, but it is more than this. In setting up a binary formulation in which 
‘sober’ PhDs lose out to ‘silly’ ones, the risk becomes amplified as a failure of moral 
and ethical sensibility on the part of the university sector which cannot - or chooses 
not - to see its own folly and the injustice of its patronage. The writer of the sober and 
industry relevant doctorate is depicted as abjectly “leav[ing] his little room each day 
on campus to hunt for industry funding and work as a part-time tutor”, “breaking 
[his]backside” as opposed to “people researching [silly] things that “attract funding”.  
 
The high protestantism of this appeal is reflected in similar media reports, e.g., 
“Thesis preaches gay gospel on Jesus” (Hobart Mercury, 29 May 2003, p.2), 
“Cappuccino courses not Nelson’s cup of tea” (South China Morning Post, 25 Oct, 
2003, p.2), “‘Silly’ degrees face the chop” (Sunday Herald Sun, 19 Oct 2003, p.1). In 
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these media articles the same PhD topics recur as exemplars of silliness and self-
indulgence. “Gay Jesus” is particularly effective as a risk event because it works as 
both a signifier of silliness and a symptom of post-Christian moral decay. As “whacky 
subjects” (South China Morning Post, 25 Oct, 2003, p.2) or “bizarre degrees” (Sunday 
Herald Sun, 19 Oct 2003, p.1), the thesis titles come to stand for the stupidity of 
universities in general i.e., “[i]f a university is silly enough to offer a particular 
course….”  (ibid), and thus constitute a direct assault on the processes and practices 
that universities use to manage their programs.  
 
As Giddens (2002) reminds us, the moral climate of risk is characterised by a push 
and pull, in that claims of negligence, waste and cover-up are inevitably accompanied 
by counter-claims of scandalmongering and needless interference. Little wonder then 
that academics are cited in these same articles as “warn[ing] against students being 
banned from freedom of thought” (Sunday Herald Sun, 19 Oct 2003, p.1), or that a 
political opponent of the federal Minister threatening to intervene declares this to be 
“an astounding attack on academic freedom” (ibid). Of course, this is not all that 
universities need to do by way of a response but it is certainly important that some 
public response is made and this is an imperative arising out of demands for greater 
public accountability from universities in general. In reconstituting “academic 
freedom” as self-indulgence and the squandering of public funds, ‘Gay Jesus’ and 
similar risk events create work for the university, and it is work that is often 
unprecedented and demanding.   
 
‘Soft’ doctorates 
A similar push and pull has been evident around allegations of ‘soft’ or ‘dumbed 
down’ doctoral programs in general. It goes without saying that ‘silly’ doctorates 
would, ipso facto, be vulnerable to charges of ‘softness’. But ‘softness’ is an 
allegation that extends its reach beyond questionable research topics. In recent years, 
accusations of ‘soft marking’ in the Australian media, e.g., “Failed students make the 
grade” (The Courier Mail, 3 February, 2001: 1), “Universities’ testing times” (The 
Advertiser, 10 February, 2001: 67), “Marking inquiry exposes glitches” (The 
Australian, 6 June, 2001: 23), “Unis get poor marks for evaluation practices” (The 
Australian, 27 June, 2001: 31) tend to target one alleged instance, but implicate all 
public universities in “perpetuating a fraud” (The Courier Mail, 3 February, 2001:1), 
and thereby abusing the public trust that is made tangible in government funding. 
Importantly, such reportage serves not merely to target the activity but to identify 
particular client and stakeholder groups as ‘riskier’ than others in terms of the threat 
to standards.  
 
In Australia, an often reiterated connection continues to be drawn between ‘soft 
marking’ and “exclusive, fee-paying overseas students” (The Courier Mail, 3 
February, 2001: 1). Allegations that “Students’ free ride Unis ‘favour fee-payers’” 
(Herald Sun, 16 May, 2001: 29), and that this constitutes a “dark side to export boom” 
(The Australian 20 June, 2001: 34) in Australian higher education, have prompted the 
question “Are international students getting a better deal?” (Australian Financial 
Review, 13 Sept, 2003, p.19). The call to “Lift Uni Standards…” (Australian 
Financial Review, 27 Oct, 2003, p.1) cannot be allowed to go unchecked by 
universities, who need to show how responsive they are to any potential danger from 
assessment activities involving international clients. The University of New South 
Wales, for example, felt the need to provide an assurance that the “enforcement of 
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English language requirements for international students [would]…be tightened”, in 
line with “toughened written English requirements” (The Australian, 6 June, 2001: 
23).  The risk to universities here is a double one - “exclusive, fee-paying overseas 
students” is a population category which comes to signify high risk not just in relation 
to standards (‘soft marking’) but in terms of the potential loss of income for the 
university sector if this highly profitable client market is threatened.   
 
The issue of organizational ‘softness’ has been extended to questions of workforce 
planning in universities. Allegations that markers of student exam papers are mainly 
casual staff who are “untrained, undervalued, underpaid, unsupervised and in some 
cases, inexpert” (“Unis get poor marks for evaluation practices”, The Australian, 27 
June, 2001: 31), foreground dangers in casualisation as ‘soft staffing’. The culprit is 
held to be a lack of uniformity in the organizational practices of universities:  
 
Casual marking staff range from young postgraduate students who [do] not 
possess the qualification in which they [are] marking, to retired professors with 
a wealth of knowledge and expertise, through industry practitioners with lots of 
experience in the field but no educational background, and all stations in 
between. (The Australian, 27 June, 2001: 31) 
 
A third level of risk comes into play when accusations involving low standards and 
international students are directed specifically to doctoral education. This has taken 
the form of an allegation that the ‘softness’ malaise is responsible for the failure of 
postgraduate international students to serve the interests of Australia as a ‘knowledge 
nation’, see “Dark side to export boom” (The Australian 20 June, 2001: 38).  The 
evidence provided for this in media reports is that the number of potential 
international students doing postgraduate research degrees is falling and so too is the 
proportion of international students in doctoral and research masters programs (ibid, 
p.38). ‘Soft’ entry, ‘soft’ courses and ‘soft’ assessment for international students mean 
scant pay-off in knowledge production, so the argument goes.  
 
While international students continue to bear the brunt of scrutiny in relation to 
allegations of softness, the honorary doctorate has a more long-term history of 
competing for space in terms of allegations of both softness and silliness. Claims that 
honorary doctorates are merely marketing devices or “publicity stunts” (‘Unis roll out 
their honours” The Courier Mail, 3 Jan, 2004, p.1) and constantly fuelled when key 
sporting or other ‘non-academic’ public figures are the recipients of the award. The 
resultant fire demands immediate hosing down by Vice Chancellors whose counter-
claims point to the ignorance of those who “[do] not understand the difference 
between an honorary award and a PhD” (ibid). The recent awarding of an honorary 
doctorate to actor Pierce Brosnan (“The Name’s Bond, Dr. Bond”, ShowBiz Ireland 
News, 6 March, 2004, p.1) was treated in the international media with mild 
incredulity, with Brosnan depicted as a “cheeky character” awarded for his 
“entrepreneurial and humanitarian achievements” (ibid).   
 
Honorary doctorates become even more destabilizing as risk events when they 
implicate more long-term political and/or ideological struggles. The recent move by 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong to award an honorary doctorate to Singapore’s 
Lew Kuan Yew prompted allegations that the university had conducted itself 
shamefully, in failing to take into account Lee’s reputation for being “someone who is 
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good at using the law to suppress people” (South China Morning Post, 19 Nov, 2000, 
p.1). This allegation is an echo of earlier times in Queensland, when Premier Sir Jo 
Bjelke-Petersen’s honorary doctorate of laws was met with strong resistance from 
within and outside universities.    
 
Otherwise suspect 
Of all the allegations that can erupt around doctorates, perhaps the one that is most 
potentially damaging is the allegation of a fraudulently obtained or claimed doctoral 
degree, the fabrication of research results, or a fraudulent claim to research done by 
others. As the most prestigious university degree, the doctorate is a desirable 
commodity in a university marketplace – and increasingly a corporate marketplace - 
characterized by academic inflation. Headlines such as “Academic stripped of 
doctoral title” (The Courier Mail, 6 Jan, 2004, p.1), “Trivial reprimand dulls 
learning’s light” (The Australian, 29 December 2003, p.1), “Universities must act 
against fraud” (The Australian, 17 April, 2002, p.8), “Professor guilty of misconduct” 
(The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 Dec, 2003, p.2) speak of the intensification of risk in 
the doctoral domain.   
 
Of significance in terms of scandalworthiness is the extent to which a particular 
university is thought to have covered up or trivialized a serious breach of ethics and/or 
misconduct rather than simply being tolerant of a minor misjudgment. Where doctoral 
students become ‘whistleblowers’, alleging misconduct against their supervisors or 
fellow academics (e.g., (The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 Dec, 2003, p.2; The 
Australian, 29 December 2003, p.1), reputational damage is swift and reputational 
rehabilitation is a long and difficult process. For those who are publicly named as 
falsely claiming a doctorate (The Courier Mail, 6 Jan, 2004, p.1), such rehabilitation 
is unlikely for the individual academic involved, because of the stigma that attaches to 
bogus qualifications as a signifier of untrustworthiness. Academic John Carmody 
argues the ‘insider’ perspective: 
 
There is nothing more important to the life and work of universities than truth. 
They are also, as Disraeli said, places of light, of liberty and of learning but all 
these must rest on a foundation of truth or everything is futile. That, 
inevitably, is why the UNSW Governing Council was so disturbed by 
…allegations of scientific dishonesty, financial fraud and bullying…(The 
Australian, 29 December 2003, p.1)        
 
Better and worse 
According to the logic of risk management, universities can guard against allegations 
of scandal only when there is more self-scrutiny, regularity and control within and 
across the entire organizational sector. This has been manifest in an “audit explosion” 
in universities (Strathern, 1997), as a defense against the sort of systemic arbitrariness 
that may allow misconduct to go unremarked or unchecked. For better and worse, 
academics are to ‘plug in’ to audit technologies, those “supremely reflexive” practices 
through which the university can make sense of itself as an organization, and 
“perform being an organization through the act of self-description” (Strathern, 1997: 
318). This alignment of individual self-management practices and organizational 
management practices is crucial in preventing allegations of scandal, with all the 
harmful effects such allegations can produce.  
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Because doctoral awards are widely understood to be the most prestigious awards the 
university offers, there is more at stake when doctoral practices are alleged to be 
scandalous. It has become too dangerous for supervisors or students to indulge in the 
sort of arbitrary, maverick, quirky or idiosyncratic behaviour that is the stereotype of 
the Oxford don or the boffin graduate. We neither endorse nor bemoan this state of 
affairs. We do, however, note the “charming absurdities” (Hobart, 1993) that are 
produced when audit is mapped onto academe. Strathern (1997) gives a nice example 
when she cites the concerns expressed by a 1992 Academic Audit Report on the 
performance on Cambridge University. The Report upbraided the University for “not 
stating its ‘aims and objectives’; for its ‘informal and uncodified understanding about 
academic quality’ and for the fact that ‘the course and examination system does not 
lend itself to a tidy and straightforward procedure for programme design’” (p.311-
312). In the singular consensus logic of audit, discontinuity prevents the organisation 
from being visible to itself and others – in Strathern’s words, “the auditors could not 
see how Cambridge University worked” (p.312).    
 
While hyper-rational systems of audit may be new for universities, it is useful to 
remember that accountability itself is not. It has always been expected that professors 
take professional and personal responsibility for good tutelage, that the good tutelage 
should have scholarship as its product. On medieval campuses, teaching guilds set 
rigorous standards for the conduct of pedagogical work and for admission to the 
profession of teaching, a vulnerable occupation in which a ‘living’ was dependent 
upon an academic’s capacity to attract and hold students. The fact that a ‘junior 
lecturer’ (batchelor) often paid students “to attend his lectures and to criticise him so 
that he might see and rectify his mistakes” (Wiles, 1966, p.148) is testimony to this. 
This is a level of ‘real world’ accountability that would be risky indeed for many 
modern-day academics.   
 
Fortunately or unfortunately, the logic that pertains in contemporary times is that it is 
only possible to know that a university is performing its educative function properly if 
its workings are made visible on the brightly lit forensic table of audit. So too the 
work of individuals in the university is made visible to themselves and others, 
including those who provide the public funding for universities. It is no accident that 
government policy-makers increasingly evoke the public interest in their calls for 
more guarantees that universities are ‘performing’. Any residual monasticism that 
may still be lurking in sandstone corridors must be flushed out into the bright light of 
accountability – rendered visible to all, and most importantly to the academics who 
still have so much (self) work to do. Without this work, it is impossible to make all 
aspects of the academic self available for (risk) management. 
 
Much time is currently spent by academics in universities bemoaning the ‘audit 
explosion’ that accompanies risk management, and particularly as it impacts on the 
changing nature of academic work, and the changing nature of the supervisor-student 
relationship. The “pervasive emphasis on external audit and quality assessment, 
mirrored by systems of internal quality assurance and control” has been criticised 
from a range of quarters (Davis, 1999; Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 1997; Kenway 
and Bullen, 2000; Shore and Wright, 1999) for adding a huge bureaucratic burden to 
an already stressed profession.  
In broad terms, the tenor of the ‘anti-audit’ argument is that the instruments of 
accountability used to define and improve quality in higher education impose models 
Comment [FoE1]: z has been 
used previously 
 11 
of organization that are incompatible with traditional academic work, particularly in 
the creative arts. Such arguments stress the “unbusiness-like nature” of academic 
endeavour, insisting that regulations for business practice are both “formulaic” and 
“shallow” as mechanisms for verifying academic labour (Davis, 1999: 7).      
 
As a ‘hyperactive’ culture, risk management certainly makes for an intensification of 
work. What we have attempted to explore, by foregrounding ‘scandal’ in doctoral 
education is the risk minimizing dynamic in which both academics and academic 
managers are implicated, for better and worse. It is too easy to blame academic 
managers for the intensification of audit mechanisms focused on waste minimization. 
As publicly funded organizations, universities must guard against the possibility that 
allegations of waste (through silliness, softness or suspect practices) could become 
risk events. They must be prevented from occurring, because of the reputational 
damage that can result, and the impact of that damage on funding as well as on the 
capacity of the university to attract students.    
    
The newly made, self-managing, hyper-rational doctoral ‘expert’ becomes less likely 
to be the target of allegations of silliness, softness and other suspect conduct, and is 
more likely to know how to respond appropriately if such allegations find their way 
into the public domain. What is less clear is whether and how the very same 
arbitrariness, maverick behaviour, quirkiness and idiosyncrasy that seems as 
important to intellectual life as it is anathema to audit, can be tolerated at all as a 
condition of doctoral  education. Perhaps it may yet survive in some as yet 
unreconstructed sandstone cloister. 
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Abstract:  
 
This paper investigates how certain doctoral practices come to count as scandalous 
and with what effects on universities. To do so, it engages with a number of recent 
media allegations that relate to doctoral practice in Australia and elsewhere. The 
analysis of these allegations is developed in terms of three broad categories, namely 
allegations of silliness in relation to thesis content, allegations of softness in relation 
to entry, rigour and assessment, and allegations of suspect conduct and/or 
credentials. The impact of such allegations on university governance is then 
addressed. 
